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RUCHO V. COMMON CAUSE—A CRITIQUE
Emmet J. Bondurant*
ABSTRACT
Once upon a time, the right to vote was held by the Supreme Court to be
among the most precious of the rights protected by the Constitution, on which
all other rights were dependent for their existence. Protection of the right to vote
was not a partisan issue. Some of the leading defenders of the right to vote—
including Justices Brennan, Powell, Stevens, and Kennedy—had all been
appointed by Republican Presidents. As the confirmation process of federal
judges by the Senate has become increasingly partisan, so have the decisions of
the Supreme Court. The partisan divide has been particularly evident in the
Court’s campaign finance and election law cases, which have, to an increasing
degree, been decided along partisan lines of the Supreme Court. These cases
illustrate that the United States is very much a government of men (and women)
and not of laws, and that Chief Justice Roberts’ claims that the Justices of the
Court are impartial umpires and that there are no Republican Justices or
Democratic Justices are myths.
No case is a better illustration of the partisan trend in the Supreme Court’s
election law decisions than Rucho v. Common Cause. In a 5-4 party-line vote,
the Court disregarded thirty years of Supreme Court precedent and held for the
first time that partisan gerrymandering is a political question beyond both the
competence and the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The majority opinion was
authored by Chief Justice Roberts, whose entire opinion was based on a
misrepresentation of the constitutional basis of the plaintiffs’ claims. The Chief
Justice also misrepresented the Court’s prior precedents and disregarded the
factual findings and undisputed evidence of the effectiveness of partisan
gerrymandering in favoring candidates and dictating electoral outcomes. The
majority opinion is both contradictory and hypocritical. While the Chief Justice
self-righteously insisted that the Court was not condoning partisan
gerrymandering and conceded that partisan gerrymandering is “incompatible
with democratic institutions” and “leads to results that reasonably seem
unjust,” the Chief Justice, nevertheless, endorsed the constitutionality of

*
Mr. Bondurant is a partner in an Atlanta law firm, Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, and he represented
the Common Cause plaintiffs as counsel of record in Rucho v. Common Cause. 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2484
(2019). He also was counsel of record and represented the plaintiffs in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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partisan gerrymandering—the very issue that the Court had just held it had no
jurisdiction to decide.
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INTRODUCTION
“No case shows more vividly that the conservative justices have abandoned
the commitment to democracy and equality that was at the core of the Warren
Court’s work” than Rucho v. Common Cause.1 In Rucho, the Supreme Court had
a perfect opportunity to end partisan gerrymandering.2
Although members of the Supreme Court on both the right and the left agree
partisan gerrymandering is “incompatible with democratic principles” and
“leads to results that reasonably seem unjust,”3 the Court voted along party lines
and held 5-4 that the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering is a political
question that is beyond both the competency and the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
Partisan gerrymanders are based on “the idea that one group can be granted
greater voting strength than another [that] is hostile to the one [person], one vote
basis of our representative government.”4 Partisan gerrymanders operate by vote
dilution,5 “jeopardize[] the ordered working of our Republic and of the
democratic process[,] . . . [a]nd amount[] to rigging elections.”6
In Rucho v. Common Cause, the Roberts Court’s “conservative majority has
taken the Court’s election jurisprudence on another pro-partisanship turn.”7 In
1

GEOFFREY R. STONE & DAVID A. STRAUSS, DEMOCRACY AND EQUALITY 171 (2020).
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506.
3
Compare Ariz. St. Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015)
(quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004) (plurality opinion)) (Justice Ginsburg and the Democratic
majority), with Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506 (Chief Justice Roberts and the Republican majority). This Article
replaces the labels of “conservative,” “liberal,” or “progressive” for Justices with reference to the party of the
President who nominated them.
4
Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 819 (1969).
5
Gerrymandering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added); see also Partisan
Gerrymandering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (noting that readers should refer to the definition
of “Gerrymandering”).
6
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1940 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring) (internal punctuation omitted).
7
Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court’s Pro-Partisanship Turn, 109 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 50, 50 (2020);
see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Anti-Carolene Court, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 178 (2020) (“Running
like a red thread through the Roberts Court’s . . . decision[] is perceived, and actual, partisan advantage
[that] . . . benefit the Republican Party, whose Presidents appointed a majority of the sitting Justices.”). For
additional examples, see Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010); Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom
PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 728 (2011); Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 536 (2013); McCutcheon
v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 193 (2014); Husted v. A. Phillip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1850 (2018); Ariz. St.
Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2677–78. In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by three other conservative Justices, argued that the Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission, which was adopted by a referendum of the people of Arizona over the
objections of the Arizona legislature, was unconstitutional under the Elections Clause because the amendment
deprived the Arizona legislature of the power to draw (and gerrymander) the lines of congressional districts.
2
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holding the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering to be a political
question that is beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts, the Court reversed
decisions of district courts that had declared unconstitutional partisan
gerrymanders of congressional districts in North Carolina and Maryland that the
Court agreed were “highly partisan by any measure” and “involve[d] blatant
examples of partisanship driving districting decisions.”8
In North Carolina, for example, Representative David Lewis, the Republican
co-chair of the reapportionment committee, declared that “electing Republicans
is better than electing Democrats” and drew the 2016 congressional map “to give
a partisan advantage to 10 Republicans and 3 Democrats because . . . it [was not]
possible to draw a map with 11 Republicans and 2 Democrats.”9
The Republican legislature in North Carolina made no attempt to defend the
constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering on the merits. It did “not argue–and
ha[s] never argued–that the 2016 Plan’s intentional disfavoring of supporters of
non-Republican candidates advances any democratic, constitutional, or public
interest.”10
Chief Justice Roberts, nevertheless, said “that the solution” to partisan
gerrymandering does not “lie[] with the federal judiciary.”11 The Court held for
the first time in recent history that the constitutionality of partisan
gerrymandering is a “political question[] beyond the reach of the federal
courts.”12
The majority did not stop there. Although the majority insisted that “[o]ur
conclusion does not condone excessive partisan gerrymandering,”13 the Chief
Justice and the Republican majority endorsed the constitutionality of partisan
gerrymandering in an advisory opinion, despite having ruled that the Court had
no jurisdiction of partisan gerrymandering claims.

Ariz. St. Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2677–78. The independent commission survived the challenge by the
Republican legislature only because Justice Kennedy refused to join his fellow Republicans in holding the
commission unconstitutional under the Elections Clause. Id. at 2657.
8
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2490–91, 2505.
9
Id. at 2509–10 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 808
(M.D.N.C. 2018)).
10
Rucho v. Common Cause, 279 F. Supp. 3d. 587, 597 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (emphasis omitted); Rucho, 318
F. Supp. 3d. at 848 (emphasis omitted).
11
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506.
12
Id. at 2506–07.
13
Id. at 2507.
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There is a striking contrast between the Chief Justice’s opinion in Rucho and
his opinion in McCutcheon v. FEC.14 In McCutcheon, the Chief Justice
emphasized that “there is no right more basic in our democracy than the right to
participate in electing our political leaders,” and that “those who govern should
be the last people to . . . decide who should govern.”15
By contrast, in Rucho, Chief Justice Roberts said that “legislatures have the
authority to engage in a certain degree of partisan gerrymandering,” and that
voters “cannot ask for the elimination of partisanship” in redistricting.16 “The
basic reason is that while it is illegal for a jurisdiction to depart from the oneperson, one-vote rule, or to engage in racial discrimination in districting, ‘a
jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering.’”17 The
Chief Justice said that even when the predominant intent of a redistricting plan
is to “secur[e] [a] partisan advantage,” that intent is “permissible” and “does not
become constitutionally impermissible like racial discrimination, when that
permissible intent ‘predominates.’”18
The Court’s decision is a body blow that will undermine public confidence
in the democratic process and republican government whose legitimacy is
dependent on the consent of the governed and the fairness of our elections.
Rucho will also undermine public confidence in the independence of the
Supreme Court itself as an impartial and non-partisan judicial body.
It also sent the wrong message to the two major political parties on the eve
of the 2020 census. Not only did the majority put the Court’s imprimatur on
partisan gerrymandering, but it also gave the major political parties the Court’s
permission to enact even the most extreme partisan gerrymanders of
congressional districts and state legislative districts after the 2020 census
without fear of interference or restraint by the federal courts.19
This Article demonstrates that Rucho v. Common Cause is intellectually
dishonest and fundamentally incorrect in at least thirteen distinct ways. The
ultimate thesis of this Article is that the Supreme Court is no longer an impartial
judicial body, but instead has become politically polarized and is likely to reflect

14

McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 191 (2014).
Id. at 191–92.
16
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2501–02.
17
Id. at 2497 (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999)).
18
Id. at 2503.
19
Currently, the governorships and both houses of the state legislatures in thirty-eight states (including
Nebraska, which has a unicameral legislature) are under one-party control. Partisan Composition of State
Legislatures, BALLOTPEDIA (Dec. 4, 2020), ballotpedia.org/partisan_composition_of_state_legislators.
15
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the ideological and partisan divisions of the Senate confirmation process for the
indefinite future.
I.

THE MAJORITY OPINION IN RUCHO V. COMMON CAUSE IS
INTELLECTUALLY DISHONEST

Rucho is “not an easy case to take seriously as doctrine. Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinion is more . . . of a debater’s brief than a judicial
opinion[,] . . . an amalgam of misdirections, distortions and less-than-pellucid
thinking.”20
Put more simply, the majority opinion is primarily based on a
misrepresentation of the constitutional basis of the plaintiffs’ claims that is
inconsistent with the ruling of the Court only a year earlier in Gill v. Whitford.21
First, the Chief Justice misrepresented the constitutional basis of the
plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claims. Partisan gerrymanders, by definition,
operate by vote dilution.22 The plaintiffs objected to the partisan gerrymanders
of their respective congressional districts primarily on the ground that they
diluted plaintiffs’ votes based on the plaintiffs’ political party affiliations and
voting histories in support of the opposition party’s candidates.23 The decisions
of the lower courts were also based on extensive findings of vote dilution that
were not contested on appeal.24 Chief Justice Roberts, nevertheless, ignored both
the plaintiffs’ allegations and the district courts’ findings of vote dilution.
Instead, the Chief Justice made up his own unique definition of partisan
gerrymandering simply by declaring that partisan gerrymandering claims are
“invariably” and “inevitably” based on the absence of proportional
representation.25
The plaintiffs’ claims were never based on proportional representation for a
reason. The Supreme Court had repeatedly held thirty years ago that “[o]ur
cases . . . clearly foreclose any claim that the Constitution requires proportional
representation.”26 By misrepresenting the plaintiffs’ claims, the Chief Justice
converted their claims from justiciable vote-dilution claims into something else
20
Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Dirty Thinking About Law and Democracy in Rucho
v. Common Cause, 2018–2019 ACS SUP. CT. REV. 293, 293–94 (2019).
21
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1919, 1931 (2018).
22
Partisan Gerrymandering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
23
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2523 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
24
Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 903 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
25
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499.
26
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 130 (1986).
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entirely—into nonjusticiable demands for proportional representation, “a ‘norm
that does not exist’ in our electoral system.”27
Second, although the Court concluded in Rucho “that partisan
gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the
federal courts,”28 the Chief Justice and the Republican majority did not let
absence of jurisdiction and judicially manageable standards prevent them from
endorsing the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering in an advisory
opinion. Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of
partisan gerrymandering, the Chief Justice declared that state “legislatures have
the authority to engage in a certain degree of partisan gerrymandering,”29 and
that “constitutional political gerrymandering” is not illegal under the
Constitution.30
Not only was this endorsement of the constitutionality of partisan
gerrymandering an extreme departure from established judicial norms, but it also
“impermissibly inject[s] the Government into the debate over who should
govern” and is a hypocritical contradiction by Chief Justice Roberts of his
dictum in McCutcheon that “those who govern should be the last people to help
decide who should govern.”31
“Constitutional partisan gerrymandering” is an oxymoron. There are no
exceptions for partisan gerrymanders in either the First Amendment or the Equal
Protection Clause that immunize partisan gerrymanders from judicial review or
authorize state legislatures to engage in a “certain degree of political
gerrymandering.”32 There is no more room in the Constitution for a certain
degree of partisan gerrymandering than there is room for any other form of vote
dilution or viewpoint discrimination—as long as the legislatures do not go too
far and their discrimination is not too “extreme.”
Third, the Chief Justice also misrepresented the Court’s prior decisions in
partisan gerrymandering cases. The Chief Justice said that the Court had left the

27

Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499 (quoting Davis, 478 U.S. at 159).
Id. at 2506–07.
29
Id. at 2501.
30
Id. at 2497 (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 555 (1999)); see also Hasen, supra note 7, at 61
(“In Rucho, the Court appeared to have recognized for the first time a constitutional right of a state to engage in
partisan gerrymandering.”).
31
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 192 (2014) (quotation marks omitted).
32
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2501.
28
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justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims “unresolved” in Davis v.
Bandemer, Vieth v. Jubelirer, and LULAC v. Perry.33 That was not true.34
The Court expressly held in Davis and in Vieth that partisan gerrymandering
claims are justiciable and are not political questions.35 The Court did not reject
the plaintiffs’ claims in those cases because there were no judicially manageable
standards in the Constitution on which to base a decision. Instead, the Court
rejected the plaintiffs’ claims in each case on the merits because they were based
on an alleged right to or the absence of proportional representation, a legal theory
that the Court held does not exist and does not violate any of the judicially
manageable standards of the Constitution.36
Fourth, buried within the Court’s opinion in Rucho is a radical new
interpretation of the Elections Clause.37 This new interpretation is the opposite
of what was intended by the Framers of the Constitution.38 The justiciability of
questions of congressional redistricting has been settled for almost ninety years
“in favor of justiciability” of questions involving the constitutionality of state
laws regulating congressional elections.39 Chief Justice Roberts would
apparently overrule these prior decisions and, with two exceptions, would
transform the Elections Clause from a constitutional limitation on the powers
delegated to the states by the Elections Clause to the power to adopt “procedural
rules” for the conduct of congressional elections into an immunity that would
divest the federal courts of jurisdiction for disputes involving state laws
regulating congressional elections, and leave those issues solely to the political
judgment of Congress whether to “make or alter” those regulations.40

33

Id. at 2498.
See, e.g., Davis, 478 U.S. at 118–27, 142–43 (“[W]e hold that political gerrymandering cases
are . . . justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause.”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 313–15 (2004)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (declining to overrule Davis); LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 413–14 (2006)
(plurality opinion) (per Kennedy, J., declining to “revisit the justiciability holding” in Davis and Vieth).
35
Davis, 478 U.S. at 143; Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306, 309–11 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
36
See Davis, 478 U.S. at 130 (“Our cases . . . clearly foreclose any claim that the Constitution requires
proportional representation.”); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 287–88 (plurality opinion).
37
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495–97.
38
See U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 832–34 (1995) (“[T]he Framers understood the
Elections Clause as a grant of authority to issue procedural regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate
electoral outcomes.”); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 527–28 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Elections
clause . . . delegates but limited power over federal elections to the States.”).
39
See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 232 (1962) (indicating that the justiciability of cases involving
congressional districts was resolved in Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932), Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375
(1932), and Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932)).
40
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
34
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Fifth, although the Chief Justice acknowledged that the congressional
redistricting plans at issue were “highly partisan, by any measure” and were
“blatant examples of partisanship driving districting decisions,”41 he said that
the partisan gerrymanders impose “no restrictions on speech, association, or any
other First Amendment activities.”42
The Chief Justice’s statement is untrue on many levels. It is contradicted by
the undisputed findings of the district court, which found that the 2016 partisan
gerrymander of North Carolina’s congressional districts injured the plaintiffs
(1) by diluting their votes,43 and (2) by imposing an undue burden on the
plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights of political association.44 Chief Justice
Roberts’s assertion that partisan gerrymanders impose “no restrictions
on . . . First Amendment activities”45 is contrary to the Court’s holding in Gill v.
Whitford.46 In Gill, the Chief Justice held a partisan gerrymander of the
Wisconsin legislature caused an injury-in-fact that was sufficient to give voters
standing when the voter’s placement in a packed or cracked district “cause[d]
his vote . . . to carry less weight than it would carry in another, hypothetical
district.”47
Sixth, the Chief Justice also said dismissively that “there is no ‘Fair Districts
Amendment’ to the Federal Constitution.”48 The Equal Protection Clause is,
however, a “Fair Districts Amendment” to the Constitution that requires states
to “adopt[] rules . . . defining electoral boundaries, [and that] those
rules . . . serve the interests of the entire community. If they serve no purpose
other than to favor one segment [and] . . . disadvantage a politically weak
segment[,] . . . they violate . . . equal protection.”49
Finally, in Rucho, Chief Justice Roberts exhibited what Richard Hasen has
described as his “real or pretextual naivete about . . . social science
[and] . . . political behavior” that fails to conform to his own conservative
political views.50 The Chief Justice downplayed the impact of partisan
41

Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491, 2505.
Id. at 2504.
43
Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 821–27 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
44
Id. at 828–29.
45
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2504.
46
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
47
Id. at 1931.
48
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507.
49
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 748 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
634 (1996) (“[I]f . . . ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must . . . mean that a bare . . . desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” (emphasis omitted)).
50
Hasen, supra note 7, at 51.
42
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gerrymandering in rigging the outcomes of elections. He said that “[e]xperience
proves that accurately predicting electoral outcomes is not so simple . . . because
the plans are based on flawed assumptions about voter preferences and
behavior.”51 He pointed to “the predictions of ‘durability’” of the 1981
gerrymander at issue in Davis v. Bandemer, and the 2001 gerrymander at issue
in Vieth v. Jubelirer, which he said “proved to be dramatically wrong” because
their partisan effects had dissipated after several election cycles.52
The Chief Justice violated Rule 52(a)(6) by substituting his own subjective
judgment for the findings of the district courts in both cases that were fully
supported by the record and were not contested on appeal.53 Chief Justice
Roberts based his “experience” on the results of the gerrymanders in Davis and
Vieth that occurred nearly forty and twenty years ago, rather than the facts in the
record that reflected the actual results of the elections that were held under the
two partisan gerrymanders before the Court in Rucho. Both gerrymanders that
were at issue in Rucho worked exactly as intended and were 100% effective in
dictating the outcomes of congressional elections 100% of the time over a
succession of congressional election cycles.54
II. PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS OPERATE THROUGH VOTE DILUTION
Partisan gerrymandering is defined as “the practice of dividing . . . electoral
districts to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the
opposition’s voting strength.”55
Partisan gerrymanders “operate[] through vote dilution—the devaluation of
one citizen’s vote as compared to others. A mapmaker draws district lines to
‘pack’ and ‘crack’ voters [who are] likely to support the disfavored party.”56

51

Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2503.
Id.
53
See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact . . . must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.”).
54
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491–92.
55
See supra note 5.
56
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2513 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 335 (2004)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[Political] [g]errymandering always involves the drawing of district boundaries to
maximize the voting strength of the dominant political faction and to minimize the strength of . . . opponents.”);
Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015) (defining partisan
gerrymandering as “the drawing of legislative district lines to subordinate adherents of one political party and
entrench a rival party in power”); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring)
(defining partisan gerrymandering as “the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries and
populations for partisan . . . political purposes”).
52
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Vote dilution is an injury-in-fact to the constitutional rights of voters, is
fairly traceable to a partisan gerrymander, and is sufficient to give a voter
standing to challenge a partisan gerrymander of the voter’s individual district.57
As Chief Justice Roberts himself explained in Gill v. Whitford, “[t]hat harm
arises from the particular composition of the voter’s own district, which causes
his vote—having been packed or cracked—to carry less weight than it would
carry in another, hypothetical district.”58
Vote dilution is a defining feature that distinguishes a partisan gerrymander
from other unconstitutional apportionments in the one-person, one-vote cases
Baker v. Carr, Wesberry v. Sanders, and Reynolds v. Sims,59 and the racial
gerrymanders in Shaw v. Reno, Miller v. Johnson, and the other racial
gerrymander cases.60
The apportionments in all three one-person, one-vote cases violate the
Constitution—but for different reasons.
Partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution because (1) they are not
viewpoint neutral—they discriminate between and segregate voters based on
their political views, their political party affiliations, and voting histories; and
(2) they operate by vote dilution—they operate directly to dilute the relative
weight, influence, and effectiveness of a ballot cast by an opponent of the party

57

Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1931 (2018).
Id.
59
Although the one-person, one-vote cases Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1 (1964), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), are referred to by the Supreme Court as “votedilution” cases, they are more accurately representation-dilution cases. In the one-person, one-vote cases, the
apportionments at issue were viewpoint neutral and did not discriminate between Democratic vis-à-vis
Republican voters. They gave rural voters in underpopulated districts greater influence and a share of
representation in state legislatures per capita (Baker, Reynolds) or in Congress (Wesberry) than voters who lived
in urban districts with much larger populations. The relative weight and influence of the ballots cast within each
district were identical to that of the ballots cast by other voters in the same district. The Georgia County Unit
System in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), was also viewpoint neutral. The Georgia County Unit System
was a miniature electoral college that gave people who lived in rural counties two county-unit votes in elections
for Governor, Senator, and other statewide offices, and gave voters in each of Georgia’s six largest counties a
maximum of six county-unit votes, which gave rural voters far greater influence in statewide elections than
voters in the six largest counties. The county unit system did not distinguish between the weight of the ballots
of Democratic voters vis-à-vis those of Republican or independent voters.
60
See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340, 347–48 (1960). In Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
641–42 (1993), the “appellants did not claim that the . . . reapportionment plan unconstitutionally ‘diluted’
[their] voting strength[,] . . . [r]ather appellants’ complaint alleged that the deliberate segregation of voters into
separate districts on the basis of race violated their constitutional right to . . . a ‘color-blind’ electoral process.”
See also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (“Shaw recognized a claim ‘analytically distinct’ from a
vote dilution claim.”).
58
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in power in comparison to the weight of ballots cast in the same district by
supporters of the party in power.
In the one-person, one-vote cases, the apportionments are viewpoint neutral
and injure voters by diluting a voter’s relative share of representation in the state
legislature or Congress, rather than by diluting the weight of a voter’s ballot. In
the racial gerrymanders, such as Shaw v. Reno, the gerrymanders were also
viewpoint neutral and did not dilute either the weight of the plaintiffs’ ballots as
compared to those of other voters in the same district based on the voters’ race,
or their share of representation as compared to voters in other districts as in the
one-person, one-vote cases.61 The Court held in Shaw v. Reno that racial
gerrymanders are unconstitutional because they injure voters by “reinforce[ing]
racial stereotypes and . . . [by] undermin[ing] . . . representative democracy by
signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular racial group [in their
districts] rather than their constituency as a whole.”62
III. RUCHO V. COMMON CAUSE IS AN ABRUPT DEPARTURE FROM
BAKER V. CARR AND WESBERRY V. SANDERS
The Court’s decision in Rucho v. Common Cause is an abrupt departure from
the principles established in Baker v. Carr63 and Wesberry v. Sanders.64
Baker held that federal courts are not barred by the political question
doctrine in Colegrove v. Green65 from ruling on the constitutionality of a state
law that divides the people of a state into election districts.66 The Court held in
Baker that the validity of state election laws under the Constitution is no
different than the validity of any state laws in any other cases, and it is not a
political question of legislative policy that must be decided in the “political
thicket” by the state legislature as the political branch of government.67
The Supreme Court explained in Baker that the only question for the courts
in an apportionment case “is [whether] the . . . state action” dividing the people
of a state into election districts is consistent “with the Federal Constitution.”68
The Court said that the answer to this question does not require a court to make
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

See Miller, 515 U.S. at 911.
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 650.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 226.
Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 67.
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1944).
Baker, 369 U.S. 186.
Id.
Id. at 226.
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“policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking.
Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and
familiar.”69
The Court held in Baker that resolution of the plaintiffs’ “equal protection
claim . . . does not require decision of a political question, and . . . the presence
of a matter affecting state government does not render the case non
justiciable.”70
Rucho v. Common Cause is an even greater departure from the Court’s
decision in Wesberry v. Sanders. In Wesberry, the Court held that the
constitutionality of state laws apportioning congressional districts is not a
political question.71 The power of Congress under the Elections Clause in Article
I § 4 to “make or alter” state regulations apportioning congressional districts
does not represent “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue [involving congressional districts] to a coordinate political department” of
the national government to the exclusion of the federal courts.72
The Court applied this principle in Wesberry when it squarely rejected “Mr.
Justice Frankfurter’s Colgrove opinion . . . that Art. I § 4 of the Constitution had
given Congress ‘exclusive authority’ to protect the right of citizens to vote for
Congressmen.”73 The Court said that “we made it clear in Baker that nothing in
the language of that article . . . support[s] . . . a construction that would
immunize state congressional apportionment laws from the power of courts to
protect the constitutional rights of individuals from legislative destruction.”74
Going further, the Court stated, “The right to vote is too important in our free
society to be stripped of judicial protection by such an interpretation of Article
I.”75
The Court held in Wesberry that it would violate Article I § 2 and “defeat
the principle . . . embodied in the Great Compromise . . . to hold that . . . the
State[] legislatures may draw the lines of congressional districts . . . to give some
voters a greater voice in choosing Congressmen than others.”76

69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id.
Id. at 232.
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 6.
Id. at 6–7.
Id.
Id. at 14 (emphasis added).

BONDURANT_6.22.21

1062

6/22/2021 9:46 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:1049

Taken together, Baker v. Carr, Wesberry v. Sanders, and Reynolds v. Sims77
established the principle that “[s]tate legislatures may [not] draw the lines of
congressional districts”78 or state legislative districts79 “to give some voters a
greater voice in choosing” their elected representatives, without regard to the
particular means that are used by the legislature to achieve that unconstitutional
objective.80
Baker, Wesberry, and Reynolds also established the principle that the
constitutionality of state laws that divide the people of a state into districts is not
a political question. It is quintessentially a judicial question. It requires, for its
resolution, a court (1) to “say what the law is” by interpreting the Constitution,
(2) to decide in the particular case whether the law has been violated by applying
the law to the facts, and (3) to frame a judicial remedy by declaring the state law
unconstitutional and (if necessary) by enjoining its enforcement by the state.81
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING HAS NOT
ALWAYS BEEN A PARTISAN ISSUE WITHIN THE SUPREME COURT
The constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering has not always been a
partisan issue that divided members of the Supreme Court on party lines. A
number of prominent Republican Justices, including Justices John Paul Stevens,
Lewis Powell, and Anthony Kennedy, have urged the Court to declare partisan
gerrymandering unconstitutional under the First Amendment or the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Karcher v. Daggett, for example, Justice Stevens emphasized that the
boundaries of congressional districts must be drawn evenhandedly to serve the
interests of the entire community, rather than to favor the parochial political
interests of the party in power.82 He said,
When a State adopts rules governing its election machinery or defining
electoral boundaries, those rules must serve the interests of the entire

77

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 14.
79
Baker, 369 U.S. at 226; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560–61.
80
See Baker, 369 U.S. at 208. Although Chief Justice Roberts did not purport to overrule Wesberry v.
Sanders, he treated the Court’s ruling in Wesberry and other one-person, one-vote cases as if they were to
exceptions to a general rule of nonjusticiability under the Elections Clause. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495. The
Constitution prohibits vote dilution. There is no support in the Court’s previous cases for this hair-splitting
distinction in Rucho, between the justiciability of some vote-dilution claims (race and one-person, one-vote
claims) and vote dilution by other means. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 208.
81
Baker, 369 U.S. at 228; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
82
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 748 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
78

BONDURANT_6.22.21

2021]

6/22/2021 9:46 AM

RUCHO V. COMMON CAUSE

community. If they serve no purpose other
segment—whether racial, ethnic, religious or
occupy a position of strength—disadvantage
segment[,] . . . they violate the constitutional
protection.83
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than to favor one
political, that may
a politically weak
guarantee of equal

Justice Powell wrote an even more forceful condemnation of partisan
gerrymandering in Davis v. Bandemer.84 Justice Powell joined the plurality in
Davis in holding that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable under the
Equal Protection Clause.85 He said that “the essence of a [partisan]
gerrymandering claim is that members of a political party as a group have been
denied the right to ‘fair and effective representation.’”86 He said that partisan
gerrymandering violates:
[t]he Equal Protection Clause[, which] guarantees citizens that their
State will govern them impartially . . . . Since the contours of a voting
district powerfully . . . affect citizens’ ability to exercise influence
through their vote, district lines should be determined in accordance
with neutral and legitimate criteria. . . . [T]he State should treat its
voters as standing in the same position, regardless of their political
beliefs or party affiliations.87

The controlling opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer was written by Justice Kennedy,
who refused to join Justice Scalia and a plurality of more conservative
Republican justices in overruling Davis v. Bandemer.88 Justice Kennedy said in
Vieth that “if a State passed an enactment that declared ‘All future apportionment
shall be drawn so as most to burden Party X’s right to fair an effective
representation, though still in accord with one-person, one-vote principles’ we
would surely conclude the Constitution has been violated.”89
Justice Kennedy also suggested that partisan gerrymanders may violate the
First Amendment:
[T]he First Amendment may be the more relevant constitutional
provision in future cases that allege unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering [because they] . . . involve the First Amendment
83

Id.
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 161 (1986).
85
Id.
86
Id. at 162.
87
Id. at 166.
88
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (2004).
89
Id. at 312; see also Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870–71 (1982) (“If a
Democratic school board, motivated by party affiliation, ordered the removal of all books written by or in favor
of Republicans, few would doubt that the order [violated the First Amendment.]”).
84
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interest of not burdening or penalizing citizens because of their
participation in the electoral process, their voting history, their
association with a political party, or their expression of political
views. . . . Under general First Amendment principles those burdens
are unconstitutional absent a compelling government interest.90

For more than thirty years, bipartisan majorities of the Supreme Court, which
included many prominent Republican Justices,91 followed Baker v. Carr and
held that the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering is not a “political
question” that can be resolved only by Congress.92
Although the plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claims in Davis, Vieth, and
LULAC were unsuccessful, they did not fail because of an absence of judicially
manageable standards. The plaintiffs’ claims failed on the merits because they
were based on a legal theory—that voters have a “right” to proportional
representation—that does not exist under the judicially manageable standards of
the Constitution.
In Davis, for example, the plaintiffs “claim[ed] that the 1981 apportionment
discriminate[d] against Democrats on a statewide basis[,] . . . that Democratic
voters over the State as a whole, not Democratic voters in particular districts,
ha[d] been subjected to unconstitutional discrimination.”93 The Court held that
the plaintiffs’ claims in Davis were justiciable, but rejected their claims on the
merits because “our cases . . . clearly foreclose any claim that the Constitution
requires proportional representation.”94
In Vieth, the plaintiffs alleged that a partisan gerrymander of congressional
districts in Pennsylvania violated the Equal Protection Clause because it
deprived a majority of the voters, who happened to be Democrats, of the right to
elect a majority of the state’s congressional delegation.95 Writing for the
plurality in Vieth, Justice Scalia said that the “appellants’ test would invalidate
the districting only when it prevents a majority of the electorate from electing a
majority of the representatives. . . . Deny it as appellants may (and do), this

90

Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314.
Davis and Vieth were decided by bipartisan majorities of the Court that included three Republican
justices—Justices Lewis Powell, John Paul Stevens, and Harry Blackmun in Davis; and Justices Anthony
Kennedy, John Paul Stevens, and David Souter in Vieth.
92
Davis, 478 U.S. at 121–27, 142; Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307; LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 413–14 (2006)
(Kennedy, J., opinion) (refusing to revisit the “justiciability holding” in Davis).
93
Davis, 478 U.S. at 127.
94
Id. at 130.
95
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 288.
91
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standard rests upon the principle that groups . . . have a right to proportional
representation. But the Constitution contains no such principle.”96
The justiciability of partisan gerrymandering did not become a partisan issue
within the Supreme Court until Justice Kennedy retired at the end of the term in
2018 and was succeeded by a more conservative Republican Justice, Brett
Kavanaugh, after a bitter partisan confirmation vote in the Senate.97 The new
and more conservative majority then wasted no time in rejecting Justice
Kennedy’s and the Court’s long-standing position that partisan gerrymandering
claims are justiciable.98
In Rucho, the new Republican majority held the constitutionality of partisan
gerrymandering, as defined by Chief Justice Roberts, to be a political question
that is beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts.99 They went even further to
endorse the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering in an advisory opinion
in which they gave partisan state legislatures the Court’s permission to “engage
in constitutional political gerrymandering.”100
V. THE COURT’S DECISION WAS BASED ON A DISTORTED DEFINITION OF
PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING THAT MISREPRESENTED THE PLAINTIFFS’
CLAIMS
Vote dilution is the defining feature of a political gerrymander.101 Vote
dilution distinguishes partisan gerrymandering claims from both one-person,
one-vote claims and the racial gerrymandering claims that were held to be
unconstitutional in Shaw v. Reno.102
Chief Justice Roberts defined partisan gerrymandering in a way that
misrepresented the constitutional basis for the plaintiffs’ claims and ignored the
multiple allegations of vote dilution in the plaintiffs’ complaints, as well as the
district courts’ findings of vote dilution on which their decisions were based.

96
Id. at 287–88 (plurality opinion). The plaintiffs’ claims in LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, were also rejected on
the merits. In LULAC, the plaintiffs contended Texas legislature’s mid-decade reapportionment of the state’s
congressional districts was unconstitutional. Id. While the Court “decline[d] to revisit the holding” in Davis that
partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim on the merits. Id. at 413–
14. The Court held that the Constitution does not prohibit mid-decade redistricting by state legislatures. Id.
97
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 2497.
101
See supra note 5.
102
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641–42 (1993); see Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995).
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At trial, for example, Common Cause alleged that the 2016 North Carolina
congressional redistricting plan unconstitutionally “diluted or nullified” the
votes of the Democratic members of Common Cause in each of North Carolina’s
thirteen congressional districts.103 The North Carolina Democratic Party
(NCDP) made similar allegations of vote dilution on behalf of its members, as
did fourteen individual North Carolina voters (thirteen Democrats and one
Republican) who alleged that the relative weight of their individual votes in
congressional elections in their districts “for the U.S. House of Representatives
will be diluted or nullified as a result of [their] placement” by the 2016 plan in
gerrymandered districts.104
The district court based its decision on meticulous district-by-district
findings of vote dilution. The court found that the 2016 plan unconstitutionally
diluted the votes of the Democratic plaintiffs in twelve of North Carolina’s
thirteen congressional districts.105 The district court also found that the 2016 plan
diluted the vote of the Republican plaintiff, Morton Lurie, by placing Mr. Lurie
in the Fourth Congressional District that had been packed with a supermajority
of Democratic voters.106
Chief Justice Roberts ignored the plaintiffs’ allegations of vote dilution and
the findings of vote dilution by the three-judge district courts in North Carolina
and Maryland. Like Humpty Dumpty in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking
Glass, Chief Justice Roberts made up his own definition of partisan
gerrymandering that had no basis in the record and misrepresented the entire

103
Amended Complaint at 2, Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (No. 1:16CV-1026).
104
Id. (emphasis added) (alleging that the 2016 congressional redistricting plan “diluted or nullified” the
votes of the Democratic members of Common Cause in each of North Carolina’s thirteen congressional
districts); id. at 4–9 (alleging that the votes of the fourteen individual plaintiffs in their districts will be “diluted
or nullified” by the 2016 plan).
105
Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 821–27. The district court also found that the 2016 plan unconstitutionality
burdened the First Amendment rights of both the NCDP and its members and the Democratic plaintiff voters by
making it more difficult for them to recruit Democratic candidates to run for congress in the gerrymandered
districts, raise money, enlist volunteers, and turn out the vote on their behalf. Id. at 829–30; see also Gill v.
Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1937–40 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring) (discussing the First Amendment injuries
caused by partisan gerrymanders); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 792 (1983).
106
Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 822 n.12. The First Amendment claims of the plaintiffs in Benisek v. Lamone,
348 F. Supp. 3d 493, 519–20 (D. Md. 2018), were based on vote dilution. The Republican plaintiffs in Benisek
alleged—and the trial court found—that the Democratic legislature in Maryland penalized Republican voters
who were residents of the heavily Republican Sixth Congressional District by (1) cracking the Sixth District and
placing Republican voters in districts packed with large majorities of Democratic voters, and (2) creating a new
Sixth District with a safe majority of Democratic voters. Id.
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legal theory and constitutional basis of the plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering
claims.107 Chief Justice Roberts simply declared ex cathedra that,
Partisan gerrymandering claims rest on an instinct that groups with a
certain level of political support should enjoy a commensurate level of
political power . . . . Explicitly or implicitly, a districting map is
alleged to be unconstitutional because it makes it too difficult for one
party to translate statewide support into seats in the
legislature. . . . Partisan gerrymandering claims invariably sound in a
desire for proportional representation. . . . [P]laintiffs inevitably ask
the courts to make their own political judgment about how much
representation particular political parties deserve.108

The plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claims were not based on
proportional representation, nor did “the plaintiffs or the lower courts in either
case ma[ke] any arguments in favor of proportional representation as the
standard for judging whether there was unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering.”109 The plaintiffs recognized that the Supreme Court held in
Davis that “[o]ur cases . . . clearly foreclose any claim that the Constitution
requires proportional representation”110 and reaffirmed that position in Vieth.111
As Justice Kagan pointed out in dissent in Rucho, “everything in [the
majority] opinion” was based on an assumption “that is not so,” and which
misrepresented the constitutional basis of the plaintiffs’ claims and the legal
theory of the plaintiffs’ case.112 Justice Kagan said that “everything in today’s
opinion assumes that these cases grew out of a ‘desire for proportional
representation’ . . . . But that is not so. . . . The plaintiffs asked only that the

107
In Through the Looking Glass, Alice complained that she did not know what Humpty Dumpty meant
by his use of the word glory. “Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. ‘Of course, you don’t—till I tell
you. . . . When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to
mean—neither more nor less.’” LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
238 (Grosset & Dunlap 1946) (1871).
108
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2499 (2019). But see Hasen, supra note 7, at 57 (arguing
that the Court’s opinion in Rucho was based on the false statement that “[p]artisan gerrymandering claims
invariably sound in a desire for proportional representation”). Chief Justice Roberts was half right—the partisan
gerrymander claims of some plaintiffs in other cases were based on proportional representation and were rejected
on the merits by the Supreme Court for that reason. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 130 (1986);
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 288 (2004) (plurality opinion). In Gill, the Court rejected Professor Whitford’s
individual claim for lack of standing because his claim was not based on vote dilution, but on his assertion that
Democrats could not achieve a majority and were not proportionally represented in the Wisconsin legislature
and could not pass legislation that Professor Whitford supported. 138 S. Ct. at 1924–25.
109
Hasen, supra note 7, at 55.
110
Davis, 478 U.S. at 130.
111
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 288.
112
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2523 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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courts bar politicians from entrenching themselves in power by diluting the votes
of their rivals’ supporters.”113
The Chief Justice conflated the purpose of a partisan gerrymander
(disproportionate representation of the majority party) with the injuries to voters
that are “fairly traceable” to a partisan gerrymander (vote dilution). The motive
of a partisan gerrymander is to give the majority party an unfair advantage and
entrench its hold on political power by allowing the majority party to capture
more seats (disproportionate representation) than it could win on a level playing
field.114 Partisan gerrymanders do not injure voters by denying them
proportional representation. They injure voters by depriving them of the
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice by diluting their votes and causing
their votes—“having been packed or cracked—to carry less weight than [they]
would carry in another, hypothetical district.”115
By defining plaintiffs’ objections to partisan gerrymandering as demands for
proportional representation, the Chief Justice, by sleight-of-hand,
misrepresented plaintiffs’ claims and the question before the Court from
justiciable claims of unconstitutional vote dilution into a nonjusticiable demand
for proportional representation, “a ‘norm that does not exist’ in our electoral
system.”116
VI. PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE UNDER A VOTE
DILUTION INJURY THEORY AND ARE NOT POLITICAL QUESTIONS
Although a majority of the Supreme Court held in a party-line vote that
partisan gerrymandering claims, as defined by Chief Justice Roberts, are
nonjusticiable political questions, that decision is totally divorced from the
Court’s decisions in other cases, many of which were authored by Chief Justice
Roberts. Rucho should not foreclose a future Supreme Court that is differently
composed from holding partisan gerrymandering to be unconstitutional under a
more accurate definition of partisan gerrymandering that reflects the injuries
inflicted by partisan gerrymanders on the constitutional rights of voters and other
political parties.
For example, the Chief Justice has recognized in other cases that “there is no
right more basic in our democracy than the right to participate in electing our
113
114
115
116

Id. (emphasis added).
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1931.
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499 (quoting Davis, 478 U.S. at 159 (O’Connor, J., opinion)).
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political leaders,” that “the First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent
application to . . . campaigns for political office,” and that “the concept that
government may restrict speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment.”117
The right to vote, join a political party, and support candidates of one’s
choice are core First Amendment rights.118 These rights are far more
fundamental to a free and democratic society than the rights of corporations and
wealthy individuals to make political contributions and expenditures to elect
candidates of their choice to public office.119
“[T]he Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters.”120 “Our
Constitution [also] leaves no room for classification of people in a way that
unnecessarily abridges” their right to vote.121 The right to vote includes the right
to cast an effective ballot of equal weight to ballots cast by all other voters in the
same district and is protected by both the First and Fourteenth Amendments.122
Partisan gerrymanders of congressional district lines are prohibited by
Article I § 2 of the Constitution precisely because their purpose and effect are to
dilute the votes of supporters of the political opposition.123 In Wesberry, the
Supreme Court held that it “would defeat . . . the Great Compromise . . . to hold
that . . . State[] legislatures may draw the lines of congressional districts . . . to
give some voters a greater voice in choosing a Congressman than others.”124
Partisan gerrymanders of congressional districts are also prohibited by the
Elections Clause in Article I § 4 of the Constitution.125 The Supreme Court has
held that the Elections Clause is a limited delegation to state legislatures of the
117

McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 191–92, 207 (2014) (quotation marks omitted).
See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976).
119
See, e.g., McCutcheon, 572 U.S. 185 (holding that a limit on individual contributions over a two-year
period to a national party and a federal candidate committee is unconstitutional); Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits the government from restricting political
contributions by corporations, nonprofit corporations, labor unions, and other associations).
120
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963).
121
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S 1, 17 (1964).
122
See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983) (holding that qualified voters have the right to
cast an effective vote); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–31 (1968) (holding that voters’ rights to an effective
vote are protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
123
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
124
Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 14; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964) (“[T]he Framers of the
Constitution [did not] intend[] to permit . . . vote-diluting discrimination to be accomplished through the devise
of districts.”).
125
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
118
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power to adopt “procedural regulations” that prescribe the “[t]imes, [p]laces and
[m]anner of holding” congressional elections.126 Partisan gerrymanders are not
“procedural regulations” that are authorized by Article I § 4. They are
substantive regulations whose purpose and effect are to dilute the weight and
effectiveness of the ballots of some voters and are ultra vires under the Elections
Clause.
The Framers of the Constitution did not intend the Elections Clause to be a
source of power that would allow state legislatures “to dictate electoral
outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade [other] important
constitutional restraints.”127 Partisan gerrymanders are ultra vires because their
purpose and their effect is to “dictate [the] . . . outcome[]” of the general election
in each gerrymandered district, to “favor” the election of the majority party’s
candidate and “disfavor” the election of rival candidates.128 Partisan
gerrymanders also violate other “important constitutional restraints,” including
the restraint on viewpoint discrimination that is those imposed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.129
The Chief Justice said in Rucho that the Framers of the Constitution did not
intend that the limitations on the authority delegated to the States by the
Elections Clause be enforced by the federal courts.130 That is not true. Alexander
Hamilton said in Federalist 78 that the duty of the courts of justice is to declare
“every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the . . . commission . . . void. No
legislative act . . . contrary to the constitution [is] . . . valid.”131
Partisan gerrymanders also violate the First Amendment prohibition against
viewpoint discrimination. Partisan gerrymanders discriminate between voters
based on their political beliefs, political party affiliations or memberships, and
voting histories in support of political candidates in past elections.132 The
purpose and the effect of a partisan gerrymander is to give supporters of the party
126
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 832 & n.46 (1995) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4,
cl. 1); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001).
127
U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 833–34; Cook, 531 U.S. at 527.
128
U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 833–34; Cook, 531 U.S. at 523 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at
833–34).
129
U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 834; Cook, 531 U.S. at 523 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 834).
130
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2019).
131
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cook ed., 1961); see also Wesberry
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 15–16 (quoting John Steele, a delegate to the North Carolina ratification convention,
noting that if state legislatures or Congress made laws under Article I, Section 4 “inconsistent with the
Constitution, independent judges will not uphold them, nor will the people obey them” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
132
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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in power greater influence in an election and penalize supporters of the political
opposition by diluting the influence and relative weight of their votes.133
Viewpoint discrimination is presumptively unconstitutional under the First
Amendment and shifts the burden of proof to the State to justify the
discrimination under strict scrutiny by a legitimate state interest of paramount
importance.134
Partisan gerrymanders also violate the Equal Protection Clause.135 “The
concept of equal justice under law requires the State to govern impartially.”136
The Supreme Court specifically held in Reynolds v. Sims that “[d]iluting the
weight of votes because of place of residence [in one district versus another]
impairs basic constitutional rights” under the Equal Protection Clause.137
VII. THE COURT’S RULING IN RUCHO V. COMMON CAUSE CONFLICTS WITH ITS
RULING IN GILL V. WHITFORD
Chief Justice Roberts’ definition of partisan gerrymandering claims in
Rucho v. Common Cause also conflicts with the Court’s ruling in Gill v.
Whitford.

133
See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) (arguing that political patronage prevents support of
opposing political interests). The 2016 congressional redistricting plan also violated the other First Amendment
principles. The purpose and the effect of the 2016 plan was to (1) dictate “what shall be orthodox in
politics . . . [or] religion” by favoring the election of Republicans over Democrats to Congress—W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); (2) penalize voters who supported Democratic candidates
by diluting their votes—Elrod, 427 U.S. at 359; Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314–15 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 324–
25 (Stevens, J., dissenting); (3) deprive Democratic voters of an equal opportunity to elect Democratic
candidates of their choice to represent them in Congress, rather than by the Republican candidates favored by
the state legislature—Ne. Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S.
656, 666 (1993); and (4) deprive Democratic voters of their First Amendment rights as citizens to join a political
party or vote for candidates of their choice—Elrod, 427 U.S. at 357; Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1937–40
(2018) (Kagan, J., concurring); Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 456 (2015) (Scalia, J., opinion) (reversing
the dismissal of a partisan gerrymandering claim that was based on the theory suggested by Justice Kennedy in
Vieth).
134
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–30 (1995); see also Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163–64 (2015) (holding that contest-based laws are presumptively
unconstitutional and are subject to strict scrutiny).
135
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (“[I]f . . . ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything,
it must . . . mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.”); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 748 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
136
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265 (1983); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 452 (1985) (“[E]lements of legitimacy and neutrality . . . must always characterize . . . the sovereign’s duty
to govern impartially.”).
137
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964).
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Gill involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a partisan gerrymander
of the Wisconsin legislature under the Equal Protection Clause.138 Chief Justice
Roberts held that the vote-dilution allegations of the four Wisconsin voters were
sufficiently definite and concrete to give these voters standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the gerrymander of their respective districts under the Equal
Protection Clause on a district-specific injury theory.139 The Court held that the
“harm” to a voter from a partisan gerrymander “arises from the particular
composition of the voter’s own district, which causes his vote—having been
packed or cracked—to carry less weight than it would carry in another,
hypothetical district.”140
The difference between the Chief Justice’s treatment of the Wisconsin
plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claims and his treatment of the plaintiffs’
partisan gerrymandering claims in Rucho is both striking and unexplained.
In Gill, Chief Justice Roberts did not reject the partisan gerrymandering
claims of four of the Wisconsin plaintiffs on the grounds that they were based,
“explicitly or implicitly,” “invariably” or “inevitably,” on “a desire for
proportional representation” as he did of plaintiffs’ claims in Rucho.141 Nor did
the Chief Justice hold that the Court was without jurisdiction of the partisan
gerrymandering claims of the four Wisconsin plaintiffs. Nor did he suggest that
their partisan gerrymandering claims should be dismissed because they
presented only political questions that are nonjusticiable by federal courts.
Although the four Wisconsin plaintiffs offered no evidence at trial in support
of their standing under Article III, the Court remanded the Wisconsin plaintiffs’
vote-dilution claims and gave each plaintiff a second chance to prove (1) that
they had standing and (2) that the cracking and packing “cause[d] his vote—
having been packed or cracked—to carry less weight than it would carry in
another, hypothetical district.”142

138
139
140
141
142

Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
Id. at 1931.
Id.
But see Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2499 (2019).
Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1931, 1933–34.
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VIII. THE CHIEF JUSTICE MISREPRESENTED THE FACT THAT THE SUPREME
COURT HAD REPEATEDLY HELD PREVIOUSLY THAT THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING IS NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION
Chief Justice Roberts said in Gill and repeated in Rucho that Davis, Vieth,
and LULAC left the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims
“unresolved.”143
Both statements are untrue. To the contrary, the Supreme Court had
previously held partisan gerrymandering to be justiciable by federal courts.
Similarly, the Supreme Court had also rejected attempts by a minority of Justices
to dismiss them as political questions.144 In Vieth, a majority of the Court refused
to overrule Davis.145
In Shapiro v. McManus, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of a
partisan gerrymander case that had been dismissed by a single judge for want of
jurisdiction without convening a three-judge district court.146 The reversal is
particularly significant because the decision of the Court was unanimous, and
the opinion was written by Justice Scalia, the author of the plurality opinion in
Vieth.147 In Shapiro, the Court acknowledged that the constitutionality of
partisan gerrymandering under the First Amendment, advanced by Justice
Kennedy in Vieth, had never been ruled on by a majority of the Court. Thus, the
Court remanded the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim for a hearing before a
three-judge district court.148 Neither Chief Justice Roberts, nor any other
member of the Supreme Court, argued that the plaintiffs’ First Amendment
claim was not justiciable or that the judgment of the lower court dismissing the
plaintiffs’ claim for want of jurisdiction should have been affirmed, rather than
reversed.
The Supreme Court had another opportunity to revisit the justiciability of
partisan gerrymandering claims in Gill.149 Although the Chief Justice did not
143

Id. at 1929; see Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2498.
See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (“[W]e hold that political gerrymandering cases
are properly justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause.”).
145
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 312–14 (2004) (plurality opinion). In LULAC, after reciting that Davis
held that “an equal protection challenge to a political gerrymander is a justiciable case or controversy” and that
“a plurality of the Court in Vieth would have held such challenges to be nonjusticiable political questions, . . . a
majority declined to do so,” the Court said that “we do not revisit the justiciability holding[s].” 548 U.S. 399,
413–14 (2004).
146
Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450 (2015).
147
Vieth, 541 U.S. 267.
148
Shapiro, 136 S. Ct. at 456.
149
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
144
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have the necessary votes to overrule Davis as long as Justice Kennedy remained
on the Court, he laid the foundation for his ruling in Gill. The Chief Justice said
in Gill that the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims had been left
“unresolved” by the Court in Davis, Vieth, and LULAC, and that Court was
deciding only the question of the Wisconsin plaintiffs’ standing in Gill and was
not deciding the justiciability of their claims.150 Despite the Chief Justice’s
attempt to separate the two issues, the Court could not have held in Gill that the
Wisconsin plaintiffs’ allegations of vote dilution were sufficient to establish
injury-in-fact as an element of their standing, if the plaintiffs’ vote-dilution
claims were also justiciable.151
The only explanation for the difference between the Court’s decisions in
Vieth, LULAC, Shapiro, and Gill, and its decision in Rucho is the change in the
composition of the Supreme Court—Justice Kennedy’s retirement and the
confirmation of Brett Kavanaugh, a more conservative Republican, as his
successor.
IX. THE FACT THAT PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS HAVE BEEN A
“TRADITIONAL PART OF POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES” DOES NOT MEAN
THAT PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
The majority opinion is replete with internal contradictions. On one hand,
Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that partisan gerrymandering is
“incompatible with democratic principles.”152 He also insisted that the Court
“does not condone excessive partisan gerrymandering.”153 On the other hand,
the Chief Justice said that partisan gerrymandering is not “illegal,”154 and that

150

Id. at 1929.
Injury-in-fact is the most important element of a plaintiff’s standing under Article III. The Court could
not have held that that the allegations of the four Wisconsin plaintiffs were sufficient to establish injury-in-fact
as an element of their standing unless there were judicially manageable standards in the Constitution that were
sufficient to enable the Court to decide (1) that the four Wisconsin plaintiffs had a cognizable legal right under
the Constitution to cast an effective and undiluted ballot, (2) that their allegations of vote dilution were sufficient
to establish a violation of that right that is fairly traceable to the partisan gerrymander of the Wisconsin legislature
and (3) that they suffered an actual injury to themselves as individuals that was sufficiently definite and concrete.
The Court held that when “the plaintiffs’ alleged harm is the dilution of their votes, that injury is district specific
[and] . . . arises from the particular composition of the voter’s own district, which causes his vote—having been
packed or cracked—to carry less weight than it would carry in another, hypothetical district.” Id. at 1930–31. A
plaintiff may or may not have standing to assert a justiciable claim, but a plaintiff like Professor Whitford can
never have standing to assert a nonjusticiable claim that is predicated on an alleged violation of a legal right,
such as the absence of proportional representation, that does not exist under the Constitution.
152
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019).
153
Id.
154
Id. at 2497.
151
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voters “cannot ask for the elimination of partisanship” in redistricting,155
because “[t]he opportunity to control the drawing of electoral district boundaries
through the legislative process of apportionment is a critical and traditional part
of politics in the United States.”156
The Chief Justice did not explain how a practice that is “incompatible with
democratic principles”157 can also be a lawful and “critical . . . part of politics in
the United States.”158
There are many practices that were once widely accepted and a “traditional
part of politics in the United States,”159 which have subsequently been held
unconstitutional.160
Political patronage and poll taxes were at least as old as the United States
itself. They were also more common, widely accepted, deeply ingrained, and
more of “a traditional part of politics in the United States”161 than partisan
gerrymandering.162 At the time of the founding, many states imposed poll taxes
and property qualifications on the right to vote.163 The political parties also used
their control over public employment, awards of government contracts, and
discretionary grants of government privileges and benefits to reward their
political friends and punish their political enemies.164 The fact that poll taxes and
political patronage had a long heritage and were once “a traditional part of
politics in the United States” did not prevent the Supreme Court from holding
poll taxes unconstitutional in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,165 nor
did it prevent the Court from holding political patronage unconstitutional under
the First Amendment in a series of cases beginning with Elrod v. Burns.166
In Elrod, the Court held that political patronage violates the First
Amendment because it restricts the “free functioning of the electoral process”
155

Id. at 2502.
Id. at 2498 (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quotation
marks omitted)).
157
Id. at 2506 (citation omitted).
158
Id. at 2498 (quoting Davis, 478 U.S. at 145 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quotation marks omitted)).
159
Davis, 478 U.S. at 145.
160
See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (segregated schools); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962) (malapportioned legislatures); Harper v. Va. State Bd. Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll taxes);
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (political patronage).
161
Davis, 478 U.S. at 145.
162
See Elrod, 427 U.S. 347 (political patronage); Harper, 383 U.S. 663 (poll taxes).
163
See Harper, 383 U.S. 663.
164
Elrod, 427 U.S. 347.
165
Harper, 383 U.S. 663.
166
Elrod, 427 U.S. 347.
156
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by coercing or deterring political participation by public employees, “starv[ing]
political opposition [of] . . . support [and] . . . tip[ping] the electoral process in
favor of the incumbent party.”167
Partisan gerrymandering has an even greater impact on First Amendment
rights than political patronage. The fact that partisan gerrymandering has been a
“traditional part of politics in the United States” has not made partisan
gerrymandering any less “incompatible with democratic principles,”168 nor is it
a justification for its continued existence any more than the long history of
segregated schools, malapportioned state legislatures and congressional
districts, poll taxes, and political patronage a justification for their continued
existence.
X. “CONSTITUTIONAL PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING” IS AN OXYMORON
“Constitutional political gerrymandering” is an oxymoron. It makes no more
sense than if the Court had said that the Constitution allows “constitutional vote
dilution” or “constitutional viewpoint discrimination.”
The Supreme Court has never held that political gerrymandering is
constitutional. The references to “constitutional political gerrymandering” in the
majority opinion in Rucho were based on dicta that was quoted out of context
from a racial gerrymandering case, Hunt v. Cromartie, in which Justice Thomas
used the term “constitutional political gerrymandering” to describe one of the
defenses that is commonly used by states to rebut a claim that race was the
predominant factor in the drawing of district lines.169
Racial gerrymandering claims are “analytically distinct” from the votedilution claims.170 In Shaw, the Court held that voters have a constitutional right
under the Equal Protection Clause to “participate in a ‘color blind’ electoral
process” and do not have to allege or prove that their votes were diluted to have
standing to challenge a racial gerrymander as a violation of that clause.171 “[A]n
effort [by a state legislature] to classify and separate voters by race injures voters
in other ways.”172 Further, the Court noted that such efforts “reinforce[] racial
stereotypes and threaten[] to undermine our system of representative democracy
167
Id. at 356; see also Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990); O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v.
City of Northlake, 515 U.S. 712 (1996).
168
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019).
169
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
170
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641–42, 650 (1993); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995).
171
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 641–42.
172
Id. at 650.
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by signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular racial group
rather than their constituency as a whole.”173 To have standing under Shaw, a
voter is not required to prove either that he or she was a member of a particular
race or that his or her vote was diluted.174 To invoke strict scrutiny of a racial
gerrymander, it is “the plaintiff’s burden is to show . . . that race was the
predominant factor [in] . . . the legislature’s decision to place a significant
number of voters within or without a particular district.”175 The Court also held
in Miller that “a State can defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandering
on racial lines” by proving that the district was gerrymandered for a different
reason.176
In Bush v. Vera, the Court held that it is not sufficient to prove in a racial
gerrymander case that the “district lines merely correlate with race.”177 If the
primary intention of the legislature was not to discriminate against Black voters
because they were Black, but because they were Democrats, “there is no racial
classification.”178
The Court did not hold in Vera that partisan gerrymandering—an intent on
the part of the legislature to discriminate against voters because they were
Democrats—would not also violate the Constitution. The Court said that “[i]f
the States’ goal is otherwise constitutional political gerrymandering, it is free to
use . . . political data” to draw district lines.179
The constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering was not raised or decided
by the Supreme Court in Vera, Hunt, or any of the Court’s other racial
gerrymander cases.180
In short, nothing in the racial gerrymandering cases supports the assertions
in the majority opinion in Rucho that “legislatures have the authority to engage
in a certain degree of partisan gerrymandering.”181
In Vieth, Justice Scalia also argued that partisan gerrymandering claims are
nonjusticiable because “partisan districting is a lawful and common practice”

173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

Id.
Id. at 641–42, 649.
Miller, 515 U.S. 916.
Id. at 912.
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 968 (1996).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2501 (2019).

BONDURANT_6.22.21

1078

6/22/2021 9:46 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:1049

and that Davis should be overruled.182 Justice Scalia conceded that “severe
partisan gerrymanders [are incompatible] with democratic principles” and that
“an excessive injection of politics is unlawful.”183 Justice Scalia, nevertheless,
insisted in Vieth that “setting out to segregate [voters] by political affiliation is
(so long as one doesn’t go too far) lawful and hence ordinary.”184
A majority of the Court rejected Justice Scalia’s opinion and refused to hold
partisan gerrymandering claims to be nonjusticiable and overrule Davis.185 The
controlling opinion in Vieth was not the plurality opinion of Justice Scalia, but
the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy who refused to agree that partisan
gerrymandering claims cannot be justiciable. He said that “[i]f a State passed an
enactment that declared ‘All future apportionment[s] shall be drawn so as most
to burden Party X’s rights to fair and effective representation’ . . . we would
surely conclude the Constitution had been violated.”186
Justice Kennedy pointed out that Justice Scalia had not said in Vieth “that
partisan gerrymandering that disfavors one party is permissible. Indeed, the
court seem[ed] to acknowledge it is not.”187
Justice Kennedy disagreed with Justice Scalia that only “an excessive
injection of politics [in districting] is unlawful.”188 Justice Kennedy said in Vieth
that “courts must be cautious about adopting a standard that turns on whether
partisan interests in the redistricting process were excessive. Excessiveness is
not easily determined.”189
182

Veith v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 286 (2004).
Id. at 292–93. Scholars and litigants have hoped to cobble together a majority of the Court by accepting
Justice Scalia’s distinction in Vieth between the usual and customary amount of partisan gerrymandering and
have urged the Court to declare that partisan gerrymanders are unconstitutional only in a limited number of rare
cases that involve only the most “extreme” partisan gerrymanders. Those arguments were destined to fail
because they were unprincipled—there is no room under the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause
for a “little bit” of viewpoint discrimination as long as it does not go too far and is not “extreme.” The distinction
was also a manageability trap. Even though the 10-3 partisan gerrymander of the congressional districts in North
Carolina was an “extreme statistical outlier,” and Representative Lewis had admitted that it was impossible to
draw an 11-2 map, Chief Justice Roberts and the conservative majority still held partisan gerrymandering claims
to be nonjusticiable. Brief for Appellee at 14, Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (No. 18-422). Chief Justice Roberts said
in Rucho, “even if we were to accept the dissent’s proposed baseline [of excessiveness] it would return us to the
original unanswerable question (How much partisan motivation and effect is too much?).” Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at
2505 (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 297).
184
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 293.
185
Id. at 267 (citing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986)).
186
Id. at 312.
187
Id. at 316 (quoting Justice Scalia’s acknowledgment that the plurality did “not disagree with [the]
judgment’ that ‘partisan gerrymanders [are incompatible] with democratic principles.’”).
188
Id.
189
Id.
183
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Justice Kennedy gave two examples of partisan gerrymanders he said were
equally “culpable.”190 The first involved an extreme gerrymander in which
“Party X . . . draws the lines so it captures every congressional seat.”191 His
second example involved gerrymanders that were less extreme in which “Party
Y . . . is not so blatant . . . but proceeds by a more subtle effort, capturing less
than all of the seats,” but still enough seats to give Party Y a majority of the
seats.192 He said that although “Party X’s gerrymander [is] more egregious. Party
Y’s gerrymander [is] more subtle . . . each is culpable.”193
Although Justice Kennedy and the majority refused to overrule Davis, they
agreed with Justice Scalia and the plurality that the dismissal of the plaintiffs’
statewide partisan gerrymandering claims should be affirmed on the merits.194
Justice Scalia said in Vieth that “appellants’ test would invalidate the districting
only when it prevents a majority of the electorate from electing a majority of
representatives . . . . Deny it as appellants may (and do), this standard rests upon
the principle that groups . . . have a right to proportional representation. But the
Constitution contains no such principle.”195
Justice Kennedy went further and suggested in Vieth that “[t]he First
Amendment may be the more relevant constitutional provision in future cases”
because partisan gerrymandering “involve[s] the First Amendment interest of
not burdening or penalizing citizens because of their participation in the electoral
process, their voting history, their association with a political party, or their
expression of political views. . . . Under general First Amendment principles
those burdens . . . are unconstitutional absent a compelling government
interest.”196
Justice Scalia objected to the application of the First Amendment to partisan
gerrymanders.197 He said that a “First Amendment claim . . . would render
unlawful all consideration of political affiliation in districting, just as it renders
unlawful all consideration of political affiliation in hiring for non-policy-level
government jobs,” and require “that political affiliation be disregarded.”198
190

Id.
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 269.
195
Id. at 287–88 (plurality opinion). This was essentially the same reason that the plaintiffs’ statewide
partisan gerrymandering claims had been rejected on the merits in Davis.
196
Id. at 314 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) (plurality opinion)). Justice Stevens also
agreed in Vieth that partisan gerrymanders violate basic First Amendment principles. Id. at 324–25.
197
Id. at 294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
198
Id.
191
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Justice Kennedy responded that this objection “misrepresent[ed] the First
Amendment analysis.”199 Justice Kennedy explained that the First Amendment
“inquiry is not whether political considerations were used,” to draw district lines,
but how and why “political classifications were used to draw district lines.”200
Justice Kennedy said that the proper inquiry “is whether political classifications
were used to burden a group’s representational rights. If . . . a State did impose
burdens and restrictions on groups or persons by reason of their views, there
would likely be a First Amendment violation, unless the State shows some
compelling interest.”201
Chief Justice Roberts did not mention, much less address, Justice Kennedy’s
opinion in Vieth. Nor did the Chief Justice mention the fact that the Court had
reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s partisan gerrymandering claim in
Shapiro v. McManus that was based on the First Amendment theory advocated
by Justice Kennedy in Vieth, which the Court held was “uncontradicted by the
majority in any of our cases.”202 The Chief Justice instead based the entire
opinion on his unique definition of partisan gerrymandering that both
misrepresented the plaintiffs’ claims and contradicted the unanimous ruling of
the Court in Gill v. Whitford.
XI. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S OPINION PROPOSES A RADICAL NEW
INTERPRETATION OF THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE
Buried within the majority opinion in Rucho, is a radical new interpretation
of the Elections Clause in Article I § 4 of the Constitution that has largely gone
unnoticed.
According to Chief Justice Roberts, “[t]o hold that legislators cannot take
partisan interests into account when drawing [congressional] district lines would
essentially countermand the Framers’ decision to entrust districting to political
entities.”203 He said that “[t]he Framers were aware of electoral problems” when
they drafted the Elections Clause “and considered what to do about them. They
settled on a characteristic approach, assigning the issue to the state legislatures
expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress.”204

199
200
201
202
203
204

Id. at 315.
Id.
Id.
Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 455 (2015).
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2497 (2019).
Id. at 2496.
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The Chief Justice accepted appellants’ argument that “through the Elections
Clause, the Framers set aside electoral issues” involving congressional elections,
“as questions that only Congress can resolve.”205 He agreed with the exception
of “two areas—one-person, one-vote and racial gerrymandering” cases.206
The Chief Justice also said that “[a]t no point” during the adoption of the
Constitution “was there a suggestion that the federal courts had a role to play”
in the enforcement of the Elections Clause, “[n]or was there any indication that
the Framers had ever heard of courts doing such a thing.”207
The Chief Justice’s interpretation of the Elections Clause is without support
in the language or the history of the Elections Clause, and it is the opposite of
what was intended by James Madison and the other Framers of the Constitution.
Chief Justice Roberts’s interpretation represents a radical departure from prior
interpretations of the Elections Clause by the Supreme Court—none of which
were addressed by the Chief Justice—they were simply ignored.
When the Elections Clause was being debated at the Constitutional
Convention, James Madison expressed a concern that that state legislatures were
likely to abuse their powers to “prescribe the times, places, and manner of
holding” of congressional elections and “to mold their regulations . . . to favor
candidates” for Congress.208 Madison said,
The Legislatures . . . ought not to have the [uncontrolled] right of
regulating the times[,] places & manner of holding elections. . . . It was
impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the
discretionary power. . . . Whenever the State Legislature had a favorite
measure to carry, they would take care so to mold their regulations as
to favor the candidates they wished to succeed.209

The Framers did two things to prevent state legislatures from abusing the
power to prescribe “the times, places and manner” of elections of members of
Congress. The Framers granted the states the power to adopt only “procedural
regulations” for the conduct of congressional elections.210 The Framers also

205
206
207
208
209
210

(2001).

Id. at 2495 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
Id.
Id. at 2496.
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 240–41 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
Id.
U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 832–33 (1995); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523
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added a proviso to Article I § 4 that reserved to Congress the power “to make or
alter” those regulations.211
In U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, the Court held that States did not have
unlimited control over their elections:
The Framers intended the Election Clause to grant States authority to
create procedural regulations, not to provide States with [a] license to
exclude . . . candidates [from being elected] . . . . [T]he Framers
understood the Elections Clause as a grant of authority to issue
procedural regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate
electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor . . . candidates, or to evade
[other] important constitutional limitations.212

It is not true that “at no point” during the framing of the Constitution “was
there a suggestion that the federal courts had a role to play” in the enforcement
of the Elections Clause,” and that there was no “indication that the Framers had
ever heard of courts doing such a thing.”213
Alexander Hamilton described the proposed new constitution in Federalist
78 as “a limited constitution . . . which contains specified exceptions to the
legislative authority [that] . . . can be preserved in . . . no other way than through
the . . . courts of justice; whose duty must be to declare all acts contrary to the
manifest tenor of the constitution void.”214 Hamilton also said that “there is
no . . . clearer principle[], than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary
to the [constitution] . . . is void.”215
Contrary to the Chief Justice’s assertions in Rucho, the Supreme Court has
held that the constitutional limitations in Article I § 4 on the powers delegated
to the states by the Elections Clause are affirmatively enforceable by the federal
courts.216
In U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, the Supreme Court declared a provision of
the Arkansas Constitution that imposed term limits on candidates for reelection
to Congress unconstitutional under the Elections Clause.217 The Court held that
211

Cook, 531 U.S. at 522.
U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 833–34 (emphasis added).
213
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2019).
214
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cook ed., 1961) (emphasis added).
215
Id. (emphasis added). John Steele said during the North Carolina ratification convention that if a state
were to use the Elections Clause “to ma[k]e laws inconsistent with the Constitution, independent judges would
not uphold them.” Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 16 (1964) (cleaned up).
216
U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 779; Cook, 531 U.S. at 510.
217
U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 779.
212
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the provision exceeded the authority delegated to the State by the Elections
Clause because it was intended to “dictate electoral outcomes” and
“disfavor . . . a class of candidates” by disqualifying long-time incumbents from
running for reelection and favoring the election of political newcomers to
Congress.218
In Cook v. Gralike, the Court held a provision of the Missouri Constitution
unconstitutional under the Elections Clause.219 Article VIII of the Missouri
Constitution required the Missouri Secretary of State to print truthful
information on the ballot regarding the position of each candidate for election to
Congress on the subject of term limits.220 The Court held that “Article VIII is
plainly designed to favor candidates who . . . support the . . . term limits
amendment . . . and to disfavor those who either oppose term limits entirely or
would prefer a different proposal. . . . [F]ar from regulating the procedural
mechanisms of elections, Article VIII attempts to ‘dictate electoral
outcomes.’”221
It is true, as Chief Justice Roberts pointed out, that in 1842 Congress
“exercised its Elections Clause power . . . to address partisan gerrymandering”
when it “required single-member districts.”222 It is also true, as Chief Justice
Roberts also pointed out, that in the census acts of 1872 and 1901, Congress
required that congressional districts have “equality of population[s],” and that
Congress omitted that requirement from later census acts.223
The Court was fully aware of these facts in 1964 when it held in Wesberry
that Article I § 2 of the Constitution requires not only that representation in
Congress be apportioned among the people not only between states, but also
within each state according to population on a one-person, one-vote basis.224 The
Court held:
Nothing in the language [of the Elections Clause in Article I,
Section 4] . . . support[s] . . . a construction that would immunize state
congressional apportionment laws which debase a citizen’s right to
vote from the power of the federal courts to protect the constitutional
rights of individuals from legislative destruction . . . . The right to vote

218
219
220
221
222
223
224

Id. at 833–34.
Cook, 531 U.S. at 510.
Id. at 514–15.
Id. at 524–26 (citing U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 833–34).
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2495 (2019).
Id. at 2495.
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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is too important . . . to be stripped of judicial protection by such an
interpretation of Article I.225

Although Wesberry was a one-person, one-vote case, the Court’s decision
was based on more fundamental constitutional principles. The Court held that to
allow states to create numerically unequal districts “would defeat the
principle . . . in the Great Compromise . . . to hold that legislatures may draw the
lines of congressional districts . . . to give some voters a greater voice in
choosing a Congressman than others.”226
The Chief Justice’s radical new interpretation of the Elections Clause is
contrary to settled law. In 1962, the Supreme Court said that Smiley v. Holm,227
Koenig v. Flynn,228 and Carroll v. Becker229 had settled the “the issue in favor
of justiciability of questions concerning congressional redistricting.”230 The
Court reaffirmed the justiciability of questions involving congressional districts
in 1964 in Wesberry.231 The Court held that the constitutionality of congressional
districts is not a political question that is committed to Congress, a coequal
branch of government, by the Elections Clause, or that a decision of those issues
by the federal courts would violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
Although Baker and Wesberry were one-person, one-vote cases, Smiley,
Koenig, and Carroll were not one-person, one-vote cases, nor were they racial
gerrymander cases. Neither were U.S. Term Limits, Cook, nor the many other
cases that have been decided by the Supreme Court under the Elections
Clause.232
It is impossible to know whether the Chief Justice’s discussion of the
Elections Clause in Rucho should be taken seriously. It would not only turn the
Elections Clause on its head and convert it from a limitation on the powers
delegated to the states into blanket immunity of state election laws and
procedures regulating federal elections from judicial review. It would also mean

225

Id. at 1, 6–7.
Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
227
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
228
Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932).
229
Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932).
230
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 232 (1962).
231
Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 6–7.
232
See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 572–73 (2000) (“States have a major role to
play in structuring . . . the election process . . . they must act within limits imposed by the Constitution.”); Eu v.
S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S.
208, 217 (1986) (“The power to regulate the time, place and manner of elections does not justify . . . the
abridgment of fundamental rights, such as the right to vote . . . or . . . the freedom of political association.”).
226
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that over ninety years of Supreme Court cases have been overruled without
explanation and would “entrust” all future disputes involving the
constitutionality of state procedures for electing members of Congress to the
political judgement of “political entities” (with the exception of the one-person,
one-vote cases).
XII. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS IMPOSE “NO
RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH, ASSOCIATION OR ANY OTHER FIRST
AMENDMENT ACTIVITIES”
The Roberts Court has been far more sympathetic to and protective of the
First Amendment rights of corporations, wealthy candidates, and businesspeople
to make political contributions and expenditures233 than of the First Amendment
rights of voters to cast an effective ballot. While the Roberts Court has treated
money as a sacred form of political speech and subjected campaign finance laws
to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment, in Rucho, Chief Justice Roberts
was dismissive of the plaintiffs’ claims that partisan gerrymandering burdened
their First Amendment rights. He said that that the partisan gerrymanders at issue
imposed “no restrictions on speech, association or any other First Amendment
activities . . . . The plaintiffs are free to engage in those activities no matter what
the effect of a plan may be on their district[s].”234
Chief Justice Roberts disregarded a fundamental rule of appellate
procedure—that “findings of fact . . . must not be set aside [on appeal] unless
clearly erroneous.”235 The district court found that the 2016 partisan
gerrymander of North Carolina’s congressional districts burdened First
Amendment rights by diluting the votes of Democratic voters in twelve of North
Carolina’s thirteen congressional districts.236 The district court also found that
the 2016 plan imposed an undue burden on the First Amendment rights of
political association of both the North Carolina Democratic Party and
Democratic voters by making it harder for them to recruit Democratic candidates
to run for Congress in the gerrymandered districts and to raise money, enlist
volunteers, and turn out the vote in support of Democratic candidates in those

233
See, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 274 (2008) (the Millionaire’s Amendment); Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310 (2010) (corporations); Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011)
(matching funds); McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (aggregate limit on contributions).
234
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2504 (2019).
235
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).
236
Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 821–27 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
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districts.237 The findings of the district court were fully supported by the
evidence and were not contested on appeal.238
Chief Justice Roberts also ignored the glaring inconsistency between his
ruling in Rucho that partisan gerrymandering does not harm the First
Amendment rights of voters and his ruling in Gill that partisan gerrymandering
does injure the constitutional rights of voters under the Equal Protection
Clause.239
The injury to the First Amendment rights of voters from partisan
gerrymandering in Rucho was far greater, more personal, more definite, more
tangible, and more concrete than the burden of a $48,600 limit imposed by the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) on the total amount that Shaun
McCutcheon, a wealthy Alabama businessman, was allowed to contribute to
congressional candidates in a single election cycle.240 The $48,600 limit in the
BCRA had no effect on McCutcheon’s First Amendment right to contribute
$2,600 every two years to each of the eight Republican candidates running for
Congress in his home state of Alabama. The BCRA’s only effect on
McCutcheon’s First Amendment rights was to limit the amount the McCutcheon
was allowed to contribute to Republican candidates who were not running to
represent him or the people of Alabama, but to Republican candidates in other
states.241
XIII. THE COURT IS WILLFULLY BLIND TO THE FACT THAT PARTISAN
GERRYMANDERING WORKS
Richard Hasen is one of the country’s leading experts on elections. He has
observed that Chief Justice Roberts has “exhibited [a] real or pretextual naivete
about what social scientist[s] . . . and . . . courts can know about voters’ political
behavior.”242
Although Chief Justice Roberts has never served in a state legislature, the
lack of first-hand legislative experience did not prevent him from discounting
the effects of partisan gerrymandering on the results of congressional elections.
237
Id. at 822 n.12; see Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring); Anderson
v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 790–95 (1983).
238
Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777.
239
Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1931.
240
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 194–95 (2014).
241
Members of the House of Representatives are elected to represent the people of their districts. They are
not elected to represent the special interests of wealthy campaign contributors from other states.
242
Hasen, supra note 7, at 51.
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He said that “[e]xperience proves that accurately predicting electoral outcomes
is not so simple . . . because [gerrymandering] plans are based on flawed
assumptions about voter preferences and behavior or because demographics and
priorities change over time.”243
The Chief Justice’s so-called “experience” was not based on the North
Carolina244 and Maryland gerrymanders, but on results of the gerrymanders in
two earlier cases—the 1981 gerrymander at issue in Davis and the 2001
gerrymander at issue in Vieth—in which the plaintiffs’ “predictions of durability
were dramatically wrong.”245
The Chief Justice ignored findings of the district courts that were based on
the actual results of the congressional elections in both North Carolina and
Maryland, which showed that both gerrymanders had worked exactly as the
mapmakers had intended and had been 100% effective in achieving their
partisan objectives 100% of the time over a succession of election cycles.
The Chief Justice apparently overlooked the fact that he had accepted these
findings earlier in the majority opinion.
The Chief Justice found that in North Carolina, “[i]n November
2016, . . . Republican candidates won 10 of the 13 congressional districts[, and]
in the 2018 elections, Republican candidates won nine congressional seats,
while Democrats won three.”246 Further, “[t]he Republican candidate narrowly
prevailed in the remaining district, but the State Board of Elections called a new
election after allegations of fraud.”247
The Chief Justice also found that the Democratic gerrymander of the Sixth
Congressional District in Maryland had also worked exactly as intended and had
been 100% effective in “flipping” the Sixth District from a safe Republican
district into a safe Democratic district that elected a Democrat to Congress in
2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018.248
Beside ignoring the actual results of the elections at issue, the Chief Justice
also ignored the testimony of Dr. Thomas Hofeller, who was the Republican
243

Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2503 (2019).
As Justice Kagan pointed out her dissent, the Court should at least have given North Carolina
Representative David “Lewis credit[;] . . . [t]he map ha[d] worked just as he planned and predicted.” Id. at 2510
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
245
Id. at 2503 (majority opinion).
246
Id. at 2491.
247
Id. at 2492.
248
Id. at 2493.
244
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National Committee’s leading gerrymandering expert for more than thirty years
and was the mapmaker who actually drew the North Carolina congressional
map.249
Dr. Hofeller testified that precinct-level data reflecting the voting history of
the people of a precinct in favor of Democratic or Republican candidates in statewide elections is the best predictor of future voting behavior and has been widely
accepted as the “industry standard,” and it is supported both by his own
experience and by social scientists and other experts.250 Dr. Hofeller also
testified that he had:
drawn numerous plans in . . . North Carolina over decades . . . . in his
experience[,] . . . the underlying political nature of the precincts in the
state does not change no matter what race you use to analyze it. . . . So
once a precinct is found to be a strong Democratic precinct, it’s
probably going to act as a strong Democratic precinct in every
subsequent election. The same would be true for Republican
precincts.251

CONCLUSION
The claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering are not political
questions and are justiciable by federal courts under two well-established injury
theories: (1) vote dilution, which is a district-specific injury-in-fact that was
explicitly recognized by the Court in Gill,252 and (2) imposition of an undue
burden on the First Amendment rights of political parties and voters of political
association.253

249
See Robert Draper, The League of Dangerous Mapmakers, ATL. MONTHLY (Oct. 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-league-of/309084/; David Daley, The Secret Files
of the Master of Modern Republican Gerrymanderer, NEW YORKER (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.newyorker.
com/news/news-desk/the-secret-files-of-the-master-of-modern-republican-gerrymandering; Michael Wines,
Republican Gerrymander Whiz Had Wider Influence Than Was Known, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/10/us/republican-gerrymander-thomas-hofeller.html; David Daley, GOP
Racial Gerrymandering Mastermind Participated in Redistricting in More States Than Previously Known, Files
Reveal, INTERCEPT (Sept. 23, 2019, 3:13 PM); David Daley, “Worth the Investment”: Memos Reveal the Scope
and Racial Animus of GOP Gerrymandering Ambitions, INTERCEPT (Sept. 27, 2019, 10:21 AM), https://
theintercept.com/2019/09/27/gerrymandering-gop-hofeller-memos/.
250
Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 803 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
251
Id. at 806.
252
138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930 (2018).
253
Id. at 1934 (Kagan, J., concurring); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 790–95 (1983); Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355–56 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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The Court based its decision in Rucho on a Humpty Dumpty definition of
partisan gerrymandering that was, as Justice Kagan pointed out, “not so.”254
Instead, the Court misrepresented the constitutional basis of the plaintiffs’
partisan gerrymandering claims and converted their claims from justiciable votedilution claims into something else entirely—into nonjusticiable demand for
proportional representation, “a ‘norm that does not exist’ in our electoral
system.”255
The conclusion is inescapable that Roberts’s Court is not composed, as the
Chief Justice has claimed, of nine impartial umpires who merely call balls and
strikes.256 Nor is it true that there are no Republican Justices or Democratic
Justices on the Supreme Court. Too many of the Court’s decisions in voting
rights, campaign finance, and other election law cases have been decided by
party-line votes of the Republican majorities that have dominated the Court for
the last decade to make those claims credible.
Although Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged in Rucho that partisan
gerrymanders are “incompatible with democratic principles,” he and the current
Republican majority nevertheless made it crystal clear “that the solution [does
not] lie[] with the federal judiciary”—at least as long as the Supreme Court is
currently composed.257
The Court’s decision in Rucho is profoundly anti-democratic and is a
reflection of the ideological and partisan nature of the confirmation process
within the Senate. Although the Rucho decision will ultimately be reversed, the
solution for partisan gerrymandering is not likely to come from the Roberts
Court; instead, it will come only when process for the selection and confirmation
of members of the Supreme Court is reformed and becomes far less partisan than
it is currently.
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Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2523 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2499 (majority opinion).
256
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United
States, Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of then-Judge John
G. Roberts, Jr. of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit).
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Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506.
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